Lugares de interés (POIs) del Mapa
0: US Northern Command
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's homeland — protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.
USNORTHCOM’s specific mission:
USNORTHCOM partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests.USNORTHCOM’s AOR includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas.
USNORTHCOM consolidates under a single unified command existing missions that were previously executed by other DOD organizations. This provides unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment.
USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president or secretary of defense.
Civil service employees and uniformed members representing all service branches work at USNORTHCOM’s headquarters located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colo.
The commander of USNORTHCOM also commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for Canada, Alaska and the continental United States.
USNORTHCOM’s civil support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction. The command provides assistance to a Primary Agency when tasked by DOD. Per the Posse Comitatus Act, military forces can provide civil support, but cannot become directly involved in law enforcement.
In providing civil support, USNORTHCOM generally operates through established Joint Task Forces subordinate to the command. An emergency must exceed the capabilities of local, state and federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes involved. In most cases, support will be limited, localized and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the point that the Primary Agency can again assume full control and management without military assistance, USNORTHCOM will exit, leaving the on-scene experts to finish the job.
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1: US Southern Command
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), located in Doral, Fla., is one of nine unified Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in the Department of Defense.
SOUTHCOM is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for:
Command Strategy 2020- Central America
- South America
- The Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions)
The command oversees the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area.
Under the leadership of a four-star commander, SOUTHCOM's staff is organized into directorates, component commands and military groups that represent SOUTHCOM in the region of Central America, South America & the Caribbean.
SOUTHCOM is a joint command comprised of more than 1,200 military and civilian personnel representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and several other federal agencies.
The services provide SOUTHCOM with component commands which, along with our Joint Special Operations component, two Joint Task Forces, one Joint Interagency Task Force, and Security Assistance Offices, perform SOUTHCOM missions and security cooperation activities.
SOUTHCOM exercises its COCOM authority through the commanders of its components, Joint Task Forces/Joint Interagency Task Force, and Security Assistance Organizations.
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2: US African Command
The United States Africa Command, also known as U.S. AFRICOM, is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). As one of six that are regionally focused, it is devoted solely to Africa. U.S. AFRICOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 54 African countries. USAFRICOM better enables the Department of Defense to work with other elements of the U.S. government and others to achieve a more stable environment where political and economic growth can take place. U.S. AFRICOM is committed to supporting U.S. government objectives through the delivery and sustainment of effective security cooperation programs that assist African nations build their security capacity to enable them to better provide for their own defense. The command was created by presidential order in 2007 and was officially activated October 1, 2007. It became fully operational October 1, 2008, with General William E. “Kip” Ward serving as its first commander. U.S. Army General Carter F. Ham became the second commander of U.S. AFRICOM on March 9, 2011.
AFRICOM Mission Statement
Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.
Commander's Intent
Our purpose is twofold: 1) to protect the U.S. homeland, American citizens abroad, and our national interests from transnational threats emanating from Africa; and 2) through sustained engagement, to enable our African partners to create a security environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued development. Should preventive or enabling efforts fail, we must always be prepared to prevail against any individual or organization that poses a threat to the United States, our national interests, or our allies and partners.
Africa Command’s activities, plans, and operations are centered on two guiding principles:
- A safe, secure, and stable Africa is in our national interest.
- Over the long run, it will be Africans who will best be able to address African security challenges and that AFRICOM most effectively advances U.S. security interests through focused security engagement with our African partners.
Our most important military tasks are:
- Deter or defeat al-Qaida and other violent extremist organizations operating in Africa and deny them safe haven.
- Strengthen the defense capabilities of key African states and regional partners. Through enduring and tailored engagement, help them build defense institutions and military forces that are capable, sustainable, subordinate to civilian authority, respectful of the rule of law, and committed to the well-being of their fellow citizens. Increase the capacity of key states to contribute to regional and international military activities aimed at preserving peace and combating transnational threats to security.
- Ensure U.S. access to and through Africa in support of global requirements.
- Be prepared, as part of a whole of government approach, to help protect Africans from mass atrocities. The most effective way in which we do this is through our sustained engagement with African militaries.
- When directed, provide military support to humanitarian assistance efforts.
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3: US Central Command
U.S.Central Command (CENTCOM) is one of 10 combatant commands in the United States military. Six of these commands, including CENTCOM, have an area of responsibility (AOR), a specific geographic region of the world where the combatant commanders may plan and conduct operations as defined under the Unified Command Plan.
Located between the European and Pacific combatant commands, U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility covers the "central" area of the globe and consists of 20 countries -- Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, SaudiArabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
There are also 62 coalition countries contributing to the war against terrorismMás sobre US Central Command
4: US Pacific Command
The U.S. Pacific Command was established as a unified command on January 1, 1947, and it is the oldest and largest of the United States' unified commands.
The present U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) includes areas originally assigned to two other unified commanders. The Far East Command, which had been established on January 1, 1947, was disestablished on July 1, 1957, and all its responsibilities were assumed by the Pacific Command. That same day the command assumed some of the responsibilities of the Alaskan Command and individual Army and Air Force component commands for the Pacific also were established in Hawaii.
In October 1957, the then Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) headquarters moved from Makalapa to Camp H.M. Smith, which is also the headquarters of the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific. CINCPAC also served concurrently as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet until January 1958, when the U.S. Pacific Fleet became a separate component with its own commander.
Added responsibilities were assigned to CINCPAC on January 1, 1972, for military forces and elements in the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and the Arctic. Alaskan Command, one of the original unified commands established on January 1, 1947, was disestablished in 1975 and its responsibilities were transferred to the Pacific Command. The Pacific Command's area of responsibility was further expanded on May 1, 1976, to the east coast of Africa. This enlarged the Pacific Command to more than 50 percent of the earth's surface, an area of over 100 million square miles.
Another enlargement of the USPACOM area took place in October 1983, when CINCPAC was assigned responsibility for the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and the Republic of Madagascar. CINCPAC was also redesignated Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC).
In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act expanded, as well as codified, the authority of the commanders of the unified commands to carry out their assigned missions and to employ combatant forces provided by the individual Services.
A new Alaskan Command (ALCOM) was established on July 7, 1989, at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, as a subordinate unified command responsible to USCINCPAC. (There is no relationship to the original ALCOM, a unified command disestablished in 1975.) This placed the defense of Alaska and its surrounding waters under the leadership of one commander, providing a unity of command absent from the state since the early 1970s.
From 1989 through 2000, three Unified Command Plans slightly reduced USPACOM's area of responsibility. With the focus of attention shifting to the Middle East, the August 16, 1989, plan assigned responsibility for the Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden to Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). The January 1, 1996 plan transferred the Seychelles and adjacent waters to USCENTCOM. On October 1, 2000, responsibility for Indian Ocean waters off Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa was transferred from USPACOM to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).
The Unified Command Plan changed as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism, as well as the new defense strategy articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. For the first time the entire surface of the earth was divided among the various unified commands. A new Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was created for homeland security and other changes in the various commands' responsibilities resulted in significant changes for USPACOM. The West Coast of North America was reassigned from USPACOM to USNORTHCOM. While Alaska was included in the reassignment to USNORTHCOM, Alaskan Command forces remained assigned to USPACOM in the “Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum.” Antarctica was also added to USPACOM's area of responsibility. Approved in April 2002, the new Unified Command Plan became effective October 1, 2002.
Effective October 24, 2002, by direction of the Secretary of Defense, the title "Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command" (USCINCPAC) was changed to "Commander, U.S. Pacific Command" (CDRUSPACOM). As stated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, there is only one Commander in Chief and that is the President of the United States.
The 2008 Unified Command Plan, signed on December 17, 2008, documented the transfer of all areas of the Indian Ocean previously assigned to USPACOM west of 68 degrees east to the newly established U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). As a result, four island countries off the east coast of Africa that were formerly assigned to PACOM were reassigned to AFRICOM: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Reunion.
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5: US European Command
Humble Beginnings
Eisenhower as SACEUROn December 14, 1946, President Harry S. Truman approved the Outline Command Plan, the first Unified Command Plan for U.S. forces. However, the United States did not fully develop the unified command structure in Europe until August 1, 1952, six years after EUCOM was established. This delay was partly due to Army Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. He was reluctant to hold the dual responsibilities of commander of all U.S. forces in the European theater and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, on May 19, 1952, he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would assume direct command of U.S. forces in Europe and establish a separate staff under a deputy to conduct joint U.S. military affairs.
Creation of the Unified Command
On May 23, 1952, the Joint Staff approved General Eisenhower’s concept. Five days later he appointed Army Gen. Thomas T. Hand as his deputy and directed him to establish the “new” unified command. Following Gen. Eisenhower’s return to the United States, Army Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway became the SACEUR on May 30, 1952. Ridgway declared his willingness to handle the dual responsibility as the Commander in Chief of United States European Command (USCINCEUR). In 1952, he delegated authority for the direction and control of EUCOM Headquarters to his deputy, General Thomas T. Hand. This continues to be essentially the same leadership structure today.
General Order No. 1 established the new unified command on August 1, 1952, and General Order No. 2 of the same date combined the three European commands—U.S. Air Forces in Europe; U.S. Army European Command (redesignated as U.S. Army Europe, USAREUR); and U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, under the new headquarters, the United States European Command aka EUCOM. In 1952, the headquarters operated temporarily in I.G. Farben Hochhaus (renamed the C. W. Abrams Building) in Frankfurt. It remained there for two years until permanent facilities were available.
The Search for Permanent Headquarters
In 1954, EUCOM headquarters relocated to Camp-de-Loges just outside Paris to be near Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. In the early 1960s, sharp policy disagreements emerged within NATO, and in 1966, French President Charles De Gaulle demanded the removal of all U.S. and NATO headquarters and forces from French soil. The search for new quarters led to HQ Seventh U.S. Army departing Patch Barracks in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany, so EUCOM headquarters could set up there March 15, 1967.
The Post-War Period
In the post-war period, EUCOM dealt with continued U.S.- Soviet tensions, including widespread unrest in Eastern Europe following Joseph Stalin’s death. EUCOM also conducted out-of-sector operations such as major contingency operations to Lebanon in 1958. In 1961, Berlin once again became a flashpoint when the Soviets erected a wall to stop the hemorrhage of people feeling Communist rule.
EUCOM continued to prepare to defend Europe and began a series of annual Return of Forces to Europe (REFORGER) exercise in 1967 to reassure its allies. Cold War crises continued, including the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The readiness of U.S. forces in Europe slowly declined due to the Vietnam War and balance of payment problems.
During the 1970s, force protection concerns in Europe grew as terrorist groups targeted U.S. facilities and personnel with bombings, kidnappings and assassinations including the kidnapping and killing of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. In the late 1970s the Soviet Union deployed SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Eastern Europe and in 1979 invaded Afghanistan. NATO responded with a two-track decision to step up negotiations while deploying U.S. intermediate-range Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to counter the Soviet threat.
In the 1980s, the armed forces began to recover from the Vietnam War and U.S. forces in Europe grew to more than 350,000. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, together with a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Colin L. Powell further strengthened the role of combatant commanders (COCOMs) by creating an operational line of control for the COCOMs that did not require service department chiefs’ review.
Goldwater-Nichols also established U.S. Special Operations Command, which activated a new sub-unified command, Special Operations Command Europe. The United States continued negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic and theater-level arms limitation, and in 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty effectively ended Soviets’ deployment of SS-20s, Pershing IIs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles.Berlin Wall
In 1989, the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe collapsed and the Cold War ended. The reunified Berlin citizens tore down their wall. As a sign of reduced tensions, EUCOM took its airborne command post off alert in 1991 and provided forces to U.S. Central Command for another out-of-sector operation, Desert Storm.
The 2000s
EUCOM reached out to emerging democracies through programs such as the Joint Contract Team Program, NATO Partnership for Peace and the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program. It actively pursued peace and stability operations in the Balkans, including Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. But it had to conduct these new missions with fewer assigned forces as its troop numbers fell below 120,000.
Immediately after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO invoked the treaty’s Article V and deployed a NATO early warning aircraft to help monitor the North American skies. EUCOM provided major forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and stepped up its efforts to protect U.S. interests in Europe and Africa. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the EUCOM theater of Casablanca, Madrid, London and Algiers made it clear that terrorism demanded a collective response. EUCOM worked to build partner capacity in Europe and Africa for peacekeeping operations and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. EUCOM launched Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Sahara in 2007 while continuing to provide rotational forces to Afghanistan and Iraq.
On Oct. 1, 2008, a portion of EUCOM’s initial work was divided as the United States established U.S. Africa Command, also located in Stuttgart, Germany, allowing EUCOM to focus on interests in Europe and the Caucasus.
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6: Shipping Lane
Suez Canal and Mid East being used along with the North East Passage
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8: Trans-Panama Pipeline
In August 2009, TPP completed a project to reverse its flows in order to enable it to carry oil from the Caribbean to the Pacific. However, by the end of 2009 the 600,000 bbl/d crude oil pipeline was only running at about 50 percent of capacity. Colombia*s Ecopetrol, as well as some African producers, have used the pipeline to send oil to the U.S. West Coast. BP and Tesoro also have contracts to use the pipeline. TPP is expanding its capacity to 1 million bbl/d by 2010, and building five new tanks with capacity to store 3.4 million barrels of oil, with three units being built in the Pacific and the remaining two in the Atlantic side.
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9: SUMED Pipeline
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10: Drone Strikes
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12: CIA and MI6 Involvement
Strong alliances before Regime Change
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13: Drone Strikes
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20: International Trade Partners
In 1990-91, Saudi Arabia played an important role in the Gulf War, developing new allies and improving existing relationships between Saudi Arabia and some other countries, but also suffering diplomatic and financial costs. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya deteriorated.
Saudi Arabia's relations with those countries which expressed support for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait--Yemen, Jordan, and Sudan--were severely strained during and immediately after the war.For example, several hundred thousand Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia after the Government of Yemen announced its position, thus exacerbating an existing border dispute.current instability in Yemen remains a significant concern to the Saudi Government.
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21: International Trade
Israeli companies, particularly in the high-tech area, have in the past enjoyed considerable success raising money on Wall Street and other world financial markets; Israel has approximately the same number of companies listed on NASDAQ as the next three countries (Canada, Japan, and Ireland) combined. Israel's tech market is very developed, and in spite of the pause in the industry's growth, the high-tech sector is likely to be the major driver of the Israeli economy. Almost 45% of Israel's exports are high tech. Most leading players, including Intel, Motorola, IBM, and Cisco have a presence in Israel.
The United States is Israel's largest single trading partner. In 2009, bilateral trade totaled $22.3 billion, a decline of about 20% over 2008, victim of the slowdown in global trade. The U.S. trade deficit with Israel was $11.1 billion in 2009.The two countries signed a free trade agreement (FTA) in 1985 that progressively eliminated tariffs on most goods traded between the two countries over the following 10 years. An agricultural trade accord signed in November 1996 addressed the remaining goods not covered in the FTA but has not entirely erased barriers to trade in the agricultural sector. Israel also has trade and cooperation agreements in place with the European Union, Canada, Mexico, and other countries.
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22: US Relations
Ousting of Saddam Hussein and first step towards 'stabilizing' the area
The US has established and maintains numerous bases in Iraq
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23: UN Relations
mplemented provisions of the CPA include the formation of the National Legislature, appointment of Cabinet members, establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan and the signing of the interim Southern Sudan Constitution, and the appointment of state governors and adoption of state constitutions. The electoral law paving the way for national elections was passed in July 2008, and elections were held at six levels in April 2010. Laws governing the Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda and the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were passed in December 2009, and the parties agreed in February 2010 to begin demarcation of the north-south border.
New CPA-mandated commissions have also been created. Thus far, those formed include the National Electoral Commission, Assessment and Evaluation Commission, National Petroleum Commission, Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission, and the North-South Border Commission. The Ceasefire Political Commission, Joint Defense Board, and Ceasefire Joint Military Committee were also established as part of the security arrangements of the CPA.
A series of UNSC resolutions in late March 2005 underscored the concerns of the international community regarding Sudan's continuing conflicts. Resolution 1590 established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of 6 months and decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. It requested UNMIS to coordinate with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to foster peace in Darfur, support implementation of the CPA, facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, provide humanitarian demining assistance, and protect human rights.
On August 30, 2006, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1706, authorizing the transition of AMIS to a larger more robust UN peacekeeping operation. To further facilitate an end to the conflict in Darfur,
Bush increased NATO presence here in 2006
Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and rebel factions took place in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007
On March 4, 2009 the ICC announced that it was issuing an arrest warrant for President Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The three-judge panel that issued the warrant did not feel there was enough evidence to include the crime of genocide on the warrant. In response to the ICC indictment, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international non-government organizations (NGOs) and closed down three Sudanese NGOs
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24: US Relations
U.S.-Ethiopian relations were established in 1903 and were good throughout the period prior to the Italian occupation in 1935. After World War II, these ties strengthened on the basis of a September 1951 treaty of amity and economic relations. In 1953, two agreements were signed: a mutual defense assistance agreement, under which the United States agreed to furnish military equipment and training, and an accord regularizing the operations of a U.S. communication facility at Asmara. Through fiscal year 1978, the United States provided Ethiopia with $282 million in military assistance and $366 million in economic assistance in agriculture, education, public health, and transportation. A Peace Corps program emphasized education, and U.S. Information Service educational and cultural exchanges were numerous.
After Ethiopia's revolution, the bilateral relationship began to cool due to the Derg's linkage with international communism and U.S. revulsion at the Derg's human rights abuses. The United States rebuffed Ethiopia's request for increased military assistance to intensify its fight against the Eritrean secessionist movement and to repel the Somali invasion. In July 1980, the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia was recalled at the request of the Ethiopian Government, and the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Embassy in the United States were headed by Charges d'Affaires. The International Security and Development Act of 1985 prohibited all U.S. economic assistance to Ethiopia with the exception of humanitarian disaster and emergency relief.
With the downfall of the Mengistu regime, U.S.-Ethiopian relations improved dramatically. Legislative restrictions on assistance to Ethiopia other than humanitarian assistance were lifted. Diplomatic relations were upgraded to the ambassadorial level in 1992. Total U.S. Government assistance, including food aid, between 1999 and 2009 was $4.7 billion. The U.S. Government provided $862 million in assistance in FY 2009, $345 million of it for combating HIV/AIDS. In addition, the U.S. Government donated more than $374 million in food assistance in 2009 to help the government cope with a severe drought.
Today, Ethiopia is an important regional security partner of the United States. U.S. development assistance to Ethiopia is focused on reducing famine vulnerability, hunger, and poverty and emphasizes economic, governance, and social sector policy reforms. Some military training funds, including training in such issues as the laws of war and observance of human rights, also are provided but are explicitly limited to non-lethal assistance and training.
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Donald Booth
Deputy Chief of Mission--Tulinabo Mushingi
Chiefs of Sections
Management--Alan Roecks
Consular--Abigail Rupp
Political/Economic--Kirk McBride
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)--Tom Staal
Defense Attache Officer--Col. Mark (Duke) Ellington
Public Affairs--Alyson Grunder
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25: Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa
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26: Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa
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27: Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa
On October 1, 2009, President Obama renewed the Sudan complex emergency disaster declaration for FY 2010. The U.S. Government continues to lead the international effort to support implementation of the CPA,
The 2005 CPA established a new Government of National Unity and the interim Government of Southern Sudan and called for wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and security arrangements between the two parties. The historic agreement provides for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from southern Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated that by the end of the fourth year of an interim period there would be elections at all levels, including for national and southern Sudan president, state governors, and national, southern Sudan, and state legislatures. These elections were held in April 2010.
On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility--and that genocide may still be occurring." President George W. Bush echoed this in July 2005, when he stated that the situation in Darfur was "clearly genocide."
The African Union, with the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the U.S., and the rest of the international community, began deploying a larger monitoring and observer force in October 2004. The UNSC had passed three resolutions (1556, 1564, and 1574), all intended to compel the Government of Sudan to rein in the Janjaweed, protect the civilian population and humanitarian participants, seek avenues toward a political settlement to the humanitarian and political crisis, and recognize the need for the rapid deployment of an expanded African Union mission in Darfur. The U.S. has been a leader in pressing for strong international action by the United Nations and its agencies.
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28: US Relations
In 2005, the government asked the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to cease operations in Eritrea.
Eritrea maintains diplomatic relations with the United States, Italy, and several other European nations, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands. Relations with these countries became strained as a result of the 2001 government crackdown against political dissidents and others, the closure of the independent press, and limits on civil liberties.
The U.S. consulate in Asmara was first established in 1942. In 1953, the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Ethiopia. The treaty granted the United States control and expansion of the important British military communications base at Kagnew near Asmara. In the 1960s, as many as 4,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed at Kagnew. In the 1970s, technological advances in the satellite and communications fields made the communications station at Kagnew increasingly obsolete. In 1974, Kagnew Station drastically reduced its personnel complement. In early 1977, the United States informed the Ethiopian Government that it intended to close Kagnew Station permanently by September 30, 1977. In the meantime, U.S. relations with the Mengistu regime were worsening. In April 1977, Mengistu abrogated the 1953 mutual defense treaty and ordered a reduction of U.S. personnel in Ethiopia, including the closure of Kagnew Communications Center and the consulate in Asmara. In August 1992, the United States reopened its consulate in Asmara, staffed with one officer. On April 27, 1993, the United States recognized Eritrea as an independent state, and on June 11, diplomatic relations were established, with a charge d'affaires. The first U.S. Ambassador arrived later that year.
In the past, the United States has provided substantial assistance to Eritrea, including food and development. In FY 2004, the United States provided over $65 million in humanitarian aid to Eritrea, including $58.1 million in food assistance and $3.47 million in refugee support.
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--vacant
Charge d'Affaires--Joel Reifman
Political/Economic Officer--Ian Rozdilsky
Consular Officer--Pamela Hack
Management Officer--Peter Wessel
Public Affairs Officer--Scott Rasmussen
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29: Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa
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30: US Operations
Operation Enduring Freedom
Birthplace of the Global War on Terror
After the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. supported the emergence of a broad-based government, representative of all Afghans, and actively encouraged a UN role in the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
The U.S. has made a long-term commitment to help Afghanistan rebuild itself after years of war. The U.S. and others in the international community currently provide resources and expertise to Afghanistan in a variety of areas, including humanitarian relief and assistance, capacity-building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs, and infrastructure projects.
During his December 1, 2009 speech at West Point, President Barack Obama laid down the core of U.S. goals in Afghanistan, which are to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Afghanistan. While the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan is not open-ended, the United States plans to remain politically, diplomatically, and economically engaged in Afghanistan for the long term.
The United States is willing to support fully the ambitious agenda set out by the recently re-elected Afghan president, focusing on reintegration, economic development, improving relations with Afghanistan’s regional partners, and steadily increasing the security responsibilities of Afghan security forces.
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32: Nuclear Threat (Supposed)
Iran states that it is only interested in the development of nuclear power facilities, however the US, UN and Israel all claim that they are developing Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Stuxnet computer virus, developed around 2009, was designed jointly between Israel and the US to destroy Iranian nuclear energy facilities. It would do this by overloading the centrifuges and causing massive equipment failures, possibly causing nuclear meltdown.
On June 9, 2010, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, the fourth legally binding resolution calling on Iran to halt its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and comply with its NPT, UNSC, and IAEA safeguards obligations. The resolution calls for several actions to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Specifically, UNSCR 1929 requires Iran to comply fully with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement; prohibits Iranian acquisition of interest in any commercial activity relating to uranium, including mining; prohibits certain arms transfers to Iran; prohibits Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles; prohibits designated individuals listed in the annex of UNSCR 1929 from traveling to or through the territory of any UN member state and freezes the assets of those entities and individuals; requires all UN member states to freeze the assets on their territories of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); requires all UN member states to seize and dispose of all items as specified in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 which could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities; requires all UN member states to freeze the assets on their territories of the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) listed in the annex of UNSCR 1929; calls upon UN member states to prevent the provision of financial services to Iran if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities; requires all UN member states to ensure that their nationals exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such businesses could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to the development of a nuclear weapons delivery system; and calls on UN member states to prohibit the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks in their territories or in Iran if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such businesses could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to the development of a nuclear weapons delivery system.
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35: Current US NATO backed insurgency
Iran making threats against NATO backed insurgency
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37: Attack Plan
A PDF is easily found in a Google search
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39: Petroleum
Full Middle East Pipeline Map
Exports--$253 billion: petroleum and petroleum products.
Saudi oil reserves are the largest in the world, and Saudi Arabia is the world's leading oil producer and exporter. Oil accounts for more than 90% of the country's exports and nearly 75% of government revenues. Proven reserves are estimated to be 263 billion barrels, about one-quarter of world oil reserves.
Saudi Arabia was a key player in coordinating the successful 1999 campaign of OPEC and other oil-producing countries to raise the price of oil to its highest level since the Gulf War by managing production and supply of petroleum. That same year saw establishment of the Supreme Economic Council to formulate and better coordinate Saudi economic development policies in order to accelerate institutional and industrial reform.
Oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia by U.S. geologists in the 1930s, although large-scale production did not begin until after World War II. Oil wealth has made possible rapid economic development, which began in earnest in the 1960s and accelerated spectacularly in the 1970s, transforming the kingdom.
More than 95% of all Saudi oil is produced on behalf of the Saudi Government by the parastatal giant Saudi ARAMCO. In June 1993, Saudi ARAMCO absorbed the state marketing and refining company (SAMAREC), becoming the world's largest fully integrated oil company. Most Saudi oil exports move by tanker from Gulf terminals at Ras Tanura and Ju'aymah. The remaining oil exports are transported via the east-west pipeline across the kingdom to the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
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40: Oil Pipeline
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41: Secretary of State Clinton
“I mean, we have a job to do. And the job consists of fighting, talking, and building.
“And Pakistan can either be part of the solution on all three of those tracks or part of the problem, and we want to pose the choice as clearly as we can,” Clinton Stated
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42: Secretary of State Clinton
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43: Secretary of State Clinton
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44: Ground Troops
Currently 45,000. Supposed to reduce to 3,000 by the end of 2011.
The reduction worries the military and may be an opening for an attack by Iran which would justify US retaliation.
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45: Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is by far the world’s most important chokepoint with an oil flow of 15.5 million barrels per day in 2009.
Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Hormuz is the world’s most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of 15.5 million barrels in 2009, down from a peak of 17 million bbl/d in 2008. Flows through the Strait in 2009 are roughly 33 percent of all seaborne traded oil (40 percent in 2008), or 17 percent of oil traded worldwide.
On average, 13 crude oil tankers per day passed eastbound through the Strait in 2009 (compared with an average of 18 in 2007-2008), with a corresponding amount of empty tankers entering westbound to pick up new cargos. More than 75 percent of these crude oil exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China representing the largest destinations.
At its narrowest point, the Strait is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world’s largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons.
Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require the use of longer alternate routes at increased transportation costs. Alternate routes include the 745 mile long Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, across Saudi Arabia from Abqaiq to the Red Sea. The East-West Pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 4.8 million bbl/d. The Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which runs parallel to the Petroline to the Red Sea, has a 290,000-bbl/d capacity.
A new bypass is currently being constructed across the United Arab Emirates that is expected to be completed in 2011. The 1.5 million bbl/d Habshan-Fujairah pipeline will cross the emirate of Abu Dhabi and end at the port of Fujairah just south of the Strait. Other alternate routes could include the deactivated 1.65-million bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA), and the deactivated 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon. Additional oil could also be pumped north via the Iraq-Turkey pipeline to the port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, but volumes have been limited by the closure of the Strategic pipeline linking north and south Iraq.
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46: The Strait of Bab el-Mandab
An estimated 3.2 million bbl/d flowed through this waterway in 2009 (vs. 4 million bbl/d in 2008) toward Europe, the United States, and Asia. The majority of traffic, about 1.8 million bbl/d, moved northbound through the Bab el-Mandab en route to the Suez/SUMED complex.
The Bab el-Mandab is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, making tanker traffic difficult and limited to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Closure of the Strait could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or Sumed Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa. This would effectively engage spare tanker capacity, and add to transit time and cost.
The Strait of Bab el-Mandab could be bypassed via the East-West oil pipeline, which crosses Saudi Arabia with a nameplate capacity of 4.8 million bbl/d. However, southbound oil traffic would still be blocked. In addition, closure of the Bab el-Mandab would block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal, except for limited trade within the Red Sea region.
Security became a concern of foreign firms doing business in the region, after a French tanker was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists in October 2002. In recent years, this region has also seen rising piracy, and Somali pirates continue to attack vessels off the northern Somali coast in the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea including the Bab el-Mandab.
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47: NATO Operations
NATO’s operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the Alliance’s most significant operational commitment to date. Established by UN mandate in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.
ISAF comprises just over 130 000 troops from 49 different countries deployed throughout Afghanistan. Its mission is to extend the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law.
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48: NATO Operations
Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, on 17 February 2011, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolution 1970, which institutes an arms embargo, freezes the personal assets of (the now former) Libyan leaders and imposes a travel ban on senior figures. Since tensions continued, it adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March authorizing member countries and regional organizations to take “all the necessary measures” to, inter alia, protect civilians and authorizing them to enforce a no-fly zone.
In March 2011, NATO Allies decided to take on all military operations regarding Libya under UN mandate, with Operation Unified Protector. For implementing the arms embargo, NATO warships and aircraft are patrolling the approaches to Libyan territorial waters. For protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas, NATO conducts reconnaissance, surveillance and information-gathering operations to identify those forces that present a threat to the Libyan people. NATO air and maritime assets can then engage military targets on the ground, at sea or in the air.
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49: NATO Operations
The NTM-I delivers its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All NATO member countries are contributing to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment.
To reinforce this initiative, NATO is working with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation framework to develop the Alliance’s long-term relationship with Iraq.
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50: NATO Operations
Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for AU peacekeepers. Following renewed AU requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of six months on several occasions – the latest until February 2012. NATO also continues to work with the AU in identifying further areas where NATO could support the African Standby Force.
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51: NATO Operations
Today, approximately 5,500 Allied troops operate in the Balkans as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory, preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier.
Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed it would continue to maintain its presence on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In June 2008, the Alliance decided to take on responsibility for supervising the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps and to help create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force.
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55: Bi-Lateral Trade Partner
As of 2008, U.S. foreign direct investment stock in Senegal totaled $18 million. In 2008, total bilateral trade in goods totaled $155 million.
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56: Uranium Mines
some of the world’s largest uranium deposits
recent global price increases have led to higher revenues for its uranium sector, which provides approximately 55.4% of national export proceeds
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57: Trade Partner
Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world ranking at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index.
$30 million in annual official aid is administered through American and local non-governmental organizations with programs addressing food security, health, local governance, youth training, girls’ education, corruption control, and improving the business environment.
October 25, 2011 President Obama signed a proclamation restoring AGOA trade preferences, this allows most of the products to enter the US duty-free
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58: Gold and Minerals
Exploitable deposits of gold are known to exist in Niger. In 2006, gold was Niger’s third most important export.In addition, substantial deposits of coal, phosphates, iron, limestone, and gypsum also have been found in Niger. The conditions necessary for their exploitation must be found.
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59: Oil Potential
Niger has oil potential. But exploration and production in the Agedem block, where Niger’s largest oil deposit resides, are essential if the benefits from such potential are to be realized.
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63: Suez Canal
Conflict had some people concerned
The Suez Canal is located in Egypt, and connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea, covering 120 miles. Petroleum (both crude oil and refined products) accounted for 16 percent of Suez cargos, measured by cargo tonnage, in 2009. An estimated 1.0 million bbl/d of crude oil and refined petroleum products flowed northbound through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea in 2009, while 0.8 million bbl/d travelled southbound into the Red Sea. This represents a decline from 2008, when 1.6 million bbl/d of oil transited northbound to Europe and other developed economies.
Almost 35,000 ships transited the Suez Canal in 2009, of which about 10 percent were petroleum tankers. With only 1,000 feet at its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to handle the VLCC (Very Large Crude Carriers) and ULCC (Ultra Large Crude Carriers) class crude oil tankers. The Suez Canal Authority is continuing enhancement and enlargement projects on the canal, and extended the depth to 66 ft in 2010 to allow over 60 percent of all tankers to use the Canal.
The 200-mile long SUMED Pipeline, or Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline provides an alternative to the Suez Canal for those cargos too large to transit the Canal. The pipeline moves crude oil northbound from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, and is owned by Arab Petroleum Pipeline Co., a joint venture between the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC, and Kuwaiti companies. Transit through the pipeline declined from approximately 2.3 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2007 to 1.1 million bbl/d in 2009.
Closure of the Suez Canal and the SUMED Pipeline would divert tankers around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, adding 6,000 miles to transit.
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64: US Trade Partner
October 25, 2011 President Obama signed a proclamation restoring AGOA trade preferences, this allows most of the products to enter the US duty-free
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65: Trade Partner
October 25, 2011 President Obama signed a proclamation restoring AGOA trade preferences, this allows most of the products to enter the US duty-free
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66: Oil Reserves
Petroleum (offshore) discovered in 1977, production began in 1980.
According to Ivorian Government figures, exports of crude oil and refined oil products totaled $2.97 billion (f.o.b.) in 2008.
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67: U.N. Involvement
The country became a member of the United Nations in 1960 and participates in most of its specialized agencies.
A mutual defense accord signed with France in 1961 provides for the stationing of French forces in Cote d'Ivoire. The 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion is based in Port Bouet adjacent to the Abidjan Airport.
In September 2002, France established a stabilization force, eventually numbering several thousand, under "Operation Licorne."
In January 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) placed approximately 1,500 peacekeeping troops from five countries--Senegal (commander), Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Niger--on the ground beside the expanded French force. On April 4, 2004, ECOWAS troops became part of the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which was authorized under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1528.
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68: US Military
A modest security assistance program that provides professional training for Ivorian military officers in the U.S. has been suspended as a result of sanctions under Section 608 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Ivoirian officers continue to participate in African and regional seminars funded by the U.S. Government, such as Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) and ECOWAS programs.
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69: French Involvement
France remains Cote d'Ivoire's single most important foreign partner. President Houphouet-Boigny, who was a minister in the French Government prior to independence, insisted that the connection with France remain strong.French is Cote d'Ivoire's official language
Thousands of French expatriates continue to work and live in Cote d'Ivoire; and the CFA franc currency is tied to the euro.However, the September 2002 events injected strain into the relationship, as the Ivoirian Government criticized France for its perceived failure to uphold its commitment under the 1961 mutual defense treaty by helping government forces recapture rebel-held areas.
However, the French did send additional forces--reaching a total of around 4,000 troops as of fall 2003--to secure the ceasefire line between regular government and rebel forces. The French contingent was joined by a force provided by various member states of ECOWAS that totaled over 3,000 as of fall 2003. In 2009, the French began the reduction of their troop level in Cote d’Ivoire. By June 2009, French Licorne was to number around 900. Anti-French riots erupted in Abidjan in late January-early February 2003, but bilateral relations subsequently improved amidst ongoing French military and diplomatic efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis.
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70: Mining
bauxite, alumina, diamonds, gold and uranium
Richly endowed with minerals, Guinea possesses over 25 billion metric tons (MT) of bauxite--and perhaps up to one half of the world's readily exploitable reserves.
In addition, Guinea's mineral wealth includes more than 4 billion tons of high-grade iron ore, significant diamond and gold deposits, and undetermined quantities of uranium.
Joint venture bauxite mining and alumina operations in northwest Guinea historically provided about 80% of Guinea's foreign exchange. The Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea (CBG) is the main player in the bauxite industry. CBG is a joint venture, in which 49% of the shares are owned by the Guinean Government and 51% by an international consortium led by Alcoa and Rio Tinto-Alcan. CBG exports about 14 million MT of high-grade bauxite every year. The Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia (CBK), a joint venture between the Government of Guinea and Russki Alumina (Rusal), produces some 2.5 million MT annually, nearly all of which is exported to Russia and Eastern Europe. Dian Dian, a Guinean/Ukrainian joint bauxite venture, has a projected production rate of 1 million MT per year, but is not expected to begin operations for several years. The Alumina Compagnie de Guinee (ACG), a subsidiary of Rusal which took over the former Friguia Consortium, produced about 2.4 million MT of bauxite in 2004, which is used as raw material for its alumina refinery. The refinery supplies about 750,000 MT of alumina for export to world markets. Both the Alcoa-Rio Tinto-Alcan consortium and the Guinea Alumina Corporation (GAC), whose stakeholders include BHP-Billiton, the Global Alumina Corporation, the Dubai Alumina Corporation, and the Mubadala Development Company, have signed conventions with the Government of Guinea to build large alumina refineries with a combined capacity of about 4 million MT per year
Diamonds and gold also are mined, though Guinea’s potential in these two industries has been historically underdeveloped By far, most diamonds are mined artisanally. The largest gold mining operation in Guinea is a joint venture between the government and Ashanti Gold Fields of Ghana. Societe Miniere de Dinguiraye (SMD) also has a large gold mining facility in Lero near the Malian border as does SEMAFO, a Canadian-based gold mining company.
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71: Mining
Unfortunately, ongoing instability in certain areas of the country, remote and rugged terrain, and an inadequate infrastructure and transportation network have made mining these resources difficult, and there have been few serious attempts to further explore or exploit them. The first significant investment in the mining sector is expected to commence soon, with the development of the Aynak copper deposit in east-central Afghanistan. This project tender, awarded to a Chinese firm and valued at over $2.5 billion, is the largest international investment in Afghanistan to date. The Ministry of Mines also plans to move forward with oil, gas, and possibly iron ore tenders in 2010.
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72: UN Operations
Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nations-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and governance to Afghanistan--creating an interim government and establishing a process to move toward a permanent government. Under the "Bonn Agreement," an Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, headed by President Hamid Karzai, renamed the government as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004. On December 7, 2004, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), launched in October 2001, was instrumental in helping restore peace and stability in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, organizing the Afghan presidential elections held in October 2004 and National Assembly elections held in 2005.On March 22, 2010, the 15-member UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Security Council Resolution 1917, renewing the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Resolution 1917 recognized the key role the UN plays in coordinating international efforts in Afghanistan and the critical support UNAMA provides to the Afghan Government on matters of security, governance, and regional cooperation. The UN is expected to play a critical role implementing the commitments made by the Afghan Government and the international community at the January 2010 London Conference. A new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan (SRSG), Staffan de Mistura of Sweden, was appointed on January 28, 2010. Resolution 1917 mandates that UNAMA and the SRSG continue to lead international civilian efforts on the rule of law, transitional justice, anti-corruption, realizing the Afghan Government’s development and governance priorities, and strengthening cooperation between ISAF and the NATO Civilian Representative to improve civilian-military coordination. UNAMA website: http://unama.unmissions.org
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73: Oil Pipeline
Natural gas and petroleum.
The most important resource has been natural gas, first tapped in 1967. At their peak during the 1980s, natural gas sales accounted for $300 million a year in export revenues (56% of the total). Ninety percent of these exports went to the Soviet Union to pay for imports and debts. However, during the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan's natural gas fields were capped to prevent sabotage by the mujahidin. Restoration of gas production has been hampered by internal strife and the disruption of traditional trading relationships following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, efforts are underway to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs). ROZs stimulate badly needed jobs in underdeveloped areas where extremists lure fighting-age young men into illicit and destabilizing activities. ROZs encourage investment by allowing duty-free access to the U.S. for certain goods produced in Afghanistan.
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74: Opium Production
Afghanistan produced a record opium poppy crop in 2007, supplying 93% of the world's opium.
An estimated 85% of Afghans are dependent on agriculture and related agribusinesses for their livelihoods. Opium poppy production and the opium trade continue to have a significant monetary share of the country’s agricultural economy.
In 2009, the United States significantly revised its counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan, ending direct involvement in eradication of poppy and increasing support for licit agriculture and interdiction.Poppy is easy to cultivate and opium is easily transported.
Much of Afghanistan's opium production is refined into heroin and is either consumed by a growing regional addict population or exported, primarily to Western Europe.
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75: OPetroleum and Natural Gas
The hydrocarbons sector is the backbone of the Algerian economy, accounting for roughly 60% of budget revenues, nearly 30% of GDP, and over 97% of export earnings.
Exports (2010)--$56.7 billion: petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products 97.58%.
Partners (First six months of 2010 est.)--U.S. 22.67%, Italy 13.78%, Spain 10.80%, France 8.83%, Netherlands 5.67%, Canada 5.07%
Algeria is the fourth-largest crude oil producer in Africa. In 2009 Algeria produced 2.13 million barrels per day of oil liquids, of which 1.33 million barrels per day was crude oil. Algeria has the tenth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the sixth-largest gas producer (2008). Algeria produced 3.05 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2008, 69% was exported. Its key oil and gas customers are Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. U.S. companies have played a major role in developing Algeria's oil and gas sector;
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76: International Trade
Imports (2010)--$40.2 billion: capital goods, food and beverages, consumer goods. Partners (First six months of 2010)--France 16.57%, China 11.83%, Italy 9.06%, Germany 6.47%, Spain 5.88%, U.S. 5.88%.
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77: Revolt and Terrorism
Terrorist violence in Algeria resulted in more than 150,000 deaths during the 1990s. Although the security situation in the country has improved, addressing the underlying issues that brought about the political turmoil of the 1990s remains the government's major task. President Bouteflika implemented the Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation on March 1, 2006, as one way to bring closure. Thus far, it has successfully gained the surrender of a number of moderate Islamists but, paradoxically, has emboldened the more hard-core elements, in particular the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which merged with al-Qaida in September 2006, and changed its name in January 2007 to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
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78: US Relations
In July 2001, President Bouteflika became the first Algerian President to visit the White House since 1985. This visit, followed by a second meeting in November 2001, a meeting in New York in September 2003, and President Bouteflika's participation at the June 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit, was indicative of the growing relationship between the United States and Algeria.Algeria has been strongly supportive of international counterterrorism efforts. The United States and Algeria consult closely on key international and regional issues. The pace and scope of senior-level visits has accelerated. In April 2006, then-Foreign Minister Bedjaoui met with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary Rice visited Algiers in September 2008. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, along with the Moroccan and Tunisian Foreign Ministers, on the margin of the March 2009 donor conference in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt. In December 2009, Algerian Foreign Minister Medelci met with Secretary Clinton in Washington, DC. In April 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder visited Algiers to sign a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Algerian Justice Minister Tayeb Belaiz.In 2007, U.S. direct investment in Algeria totaled $5.45 billion, mostly in the hydrocarbon sector. American companies also are active in the banking and finance, services, pharmaceuticals, medical facilities, telecommunications, aviation, seawater desalination, energy production, and information technology sectors. Algeria is the United States' second to third-largest trading partner in the Middle East/North African region. U.S. exports to Algeria totaled $1.126 billion in 2010, and U.S. imports from Algeria reached $13.29 billion in 2010, primarily in the form of crude oil. In March 2004, President George W. Bush designated Algeria a beneficiary country for duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In July 2001, the United States and Algeria signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which established common principles on which the economic relationship is founded and forms a platform for negotiating other bilateral agreements. Within the framework of the U.S.-North African Economic Partnership (USNAEP), the United States provided about $1.0 million in technical assistance to Algeria in 2003. This program supported and encouraged Algeria's economic reform program and included support for World Trade Organization accession negotiations, debt management, and improving the investment climate. In 2003, USNAEP programs were rolled over into Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) activities, which provide funding for political and economic development programs in Algeria. The U.S. Government continues to encourage Algeria to make necessary changes to accede to the World Trade Organization, move toward transparent economic policies, and liberalize its investment climate. The U.S. also funds a program supporting Algerian efforts to develop a functioning, transparent banking and income tax system. The U.S. Department of Commerce established a Commercial Attaché in Algiers in 2008.
Cooperation between the Algerian and U.S. militaries continues to grow. Exchanges between both sides are frequent, and Algeria has hosted senior U.S. military officials. In May 2005, the United States and Algeria conducted their first formal joint military dialogue in Washington, DC; the second joint military dialogue took place in Algiers in November 2006, and a third occurred in October 2008. The NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command, General James L. Jones visited Algeria in June and August 2005, and then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Algeria in February 2006. In November 2009, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General W. Ward visited Algiers and met with Algerian officials, including President Bouteflika. The United States and Algeria have also conducted bilateral naval and Special Forces exercises, and Algeria has hosted U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ship visits. In addition, the United States has a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program ($870,000 in FY 2009 and $950,000 in FY 2010) for training Algerian military personnel in the United States, and Algeria participates in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
The United States has implemented university linkages programs and has placed two English Language Fellows, the first since 1993, with the Ministry of Education to assist in the development of English as a Second Language courses at the Ben Aknoun Training Center. In 2006, Algeria was again the recipient of a grant under the Ambassadors' Fund for Cultural Preservation. That fund provided a grant of $106,110 to restore the El Pacha Mosque in Oran. Algeria also received an $80,000 grant to fund micro-scholarships to design and implement an American English-language program for Algerian high school students in four major cities. In 2009, the U.S. Government began a pilot program in Constantine, Algeria at Mentouri University. The program is designed to ease the transition between the university and the workforce, fight unemployment, and train Algerian university professors and students in English and business management to better equip graduates to secure meaningful employment.
In November 2009, Algeria and the United States reciprocally extended visa duration to two years for most visa categories, including tourists, businesspeople, and students. Also in November 2009, the countries finalized language for both a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) and a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement. Attorney General Eric Holder signed the MLAT with Algeria during an April 2010 visit. Law enforcement cooperation continues to increase, both in the field of counterterrorism and in countering more conventional transnational crimes. The FBI established a Legal Attaché Office at the U.S. Embassy in Algiers in 2008.
Funding through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has been allocated to support the work of Algeria's developing civil society through programming that provides training to journalists, businesspeople, female entrepreneurs, legislators, legal professionals, and the heads of leading nongovernmental organizations.
The official U.S. presence in Algeria is expanding following over a decade of limited staffing, reflecting the general improvement in the security environment. During the past four years, the U.S. Embassy has moved toward more normal operations and now provides most embassy services to the American and Algerian communities.
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79: African Relations
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80: Petroleum and natural gas
The U.S. has a large assistance program in Egypt and provides funding for a variety of programs.Through its Human and Economic Sector Development cash transfer program, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is supporting benchmarks that aim to stimulate the small and microenterprise sectors, improve budget transparency to increase macroeconomic stability, and improve the trade regime and business climate. To support the Middle East peace process through regional economic integration, the United States permits products to be imported from Egypt without tariffs if they have been produced by factories registered in Qualified Industrial Zones and 10.5% of the inputs of these products originate from Israel.
Crude oil is found primarily in the Gulf of Suez and in the Western Desert. Natural gas is found mainly in the Nile Delta, off the Mediterranean seashore, and in the Western Desert. Oil and gas accounts for approximately 12% of GDP. Export of petroleum and related products (including bunker and aviation sales) amounted to approximately $11.4 billion in fiscal year 2008-2009.
Crude oil production has been in decline for over a decade, from a high of more than 920,000 barrels per day (BPD) in 1995 to less than 550,000 BPD as of October 2009. To minimize the growing domestic demand for oil-based products, estimated in July 2009 at more than 31 million metric tons per year, Egypt is encouraging the production of natural gas. Production of natural gas doubled from 21 million metric tons in mid-2003 to 43 million metric tons in July 2008. In FY 2008-2009, natural gas production amounted to 6.4 billion cubic feet (BCF) per day. In March 2009 the Egyptian Gas Holding Company announced plans for 23 new exploration wells with total investments of $1.1 billion during fiscal year 2009-2010.
As of July 2009, crude oil and condensates reserves were estimated at 4.4 billion barrels, and proven natural gas reserves were estimated at 77 trillion cubic feet (TCF) with possible additional reserves totaling another 40-50 TCF. However, independent oil and gas experts indicated that Egypt’s proven natural gas reserves may be as high as 70 TCF, of which more than 80% (i.e., 57 TCF) is from the cone of the Nile Delta. Texas-based Apache Oil Company is the largest American investor in Egypt, with a total investment of more than $7 billion since 1995.
The Ministry of Petroleum regards expansion of the Egyptian petrochemical industry and increased exports of natural gas as significant strategic objectives. Three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains are operating in Egypt. The first is in Damietta on the eastern side of the Nile Delta and is operated by the Spanish electric utility Union Fenosa; the second is a project located at Idku in the western Delta, with British Gas (BG) Group and the Malaysian state oil company Petronas as the major investors; and the third, the Mediterranean Gas Complex in Port Said, utilizes gas for export and domestic consumption, with the Italian company AGIP and BP as the main shareholders.
Egypt and Jordan established the Eastern Gas Company to export natural gas to Jordan, and then later to Syria and Lebanon. In summer 2003 Egypt completed the first phase of the project by exporting gas to Jordan via a new pipeline from El Arish on Egypt's north Sinai cost to Taba on the Gulf of Aqaba, and then underwater to the Jordanian city of Aqaba. The second phase was completed in 2005, connecting the pipeline to the Jordanian town of Rihab, north of the capital Amman. In 2008, a new pipeline to export gas to Syria began operations and provides about 212 million cubic feet per day. Egyptian natural gas shipments in late 2009 reached Lebanon via an extension of the Arab pipeline from Syria. Lebanon reportedly will receive about 30 million cubic feet per day. While by 2008 gas exports grew to 12.6 million metric tons of oil equivalent, the Government of Egypt may have to import natural gas within 3 to 4 years in order to meet domestic demand, particularly for producing electricity. In the wake of higher world market gas prices, the Government of Egypt in 2009 succeeded in renegotiating upward the price received under existing long-term gas export contracts with purchasers in Europe, Jordan, and Israel.
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81: Mining and Mineral Deposits
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82: US Relations
An important pillar of the bilateral relationship remains U.S. security and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. U.S. military aid to Egypt totals over $1.3 billion annually. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided over $28 billion in economic and development assistance to Egypt since 1975. Early assistance focused on infrastructure, health, food supply, and agriculture. The Commodity Import Program, through which USAID provided hundreds of millions of dollars in financing to enable the Egyptian private sector to import U.S. goods, was one of the largest and most popular USAID programs. Current programs focus on trade and investment; utilities; education; healthier, planned families; natural resources; democracy and governance; and other programs supported by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).
U.S. military cooperation has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional security and stability. Under Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, the U.S. has provided F-4 jet aircraft, F-16 jet fighters, M-60A3 and M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters, antiaircraft missile batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, and other equipment. The U.S. and Egypt also participate in combined military exercises, including deployments of U.S. troops to Egypt. Every other year, Egypt hosts Operation Bright Star, a multilateral military exercise with the U.S., and the largest military exercise in the region. Units of the U.S. 6th Fleet are regular visitors to Egyptian ports.
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Margaret Scobey
Deputy Chief of Mission--Matthew Tueller
Economic/Political Affairs--Donald Blome
Consular Affairs--Roberto Powers
Management Affairs--Dolores Brown
Public Affairs--Haynes Mahoney
USAID--Hilda Arellano
Defense Attache--Maj. Gen. F.C. Williams
Office of Military Cooperation--Maj. Gen. F.C. Williams
Foreign Commercial Service--Margaret Keshishian
Foreign Agricultural Service--Jonathan Gressel
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83: Mining
Although Sudan is reputed to have great mineral resources, exploration has been quite limited, and the country’s real potential is unknown. Small quantities of asbestos, chromium, and mica are exploited commercially.
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84: Petroleum and Natural Gas
Sudan produces about 401,000 barrels per day (b/d) (2005 est.) of oil, which brought in about $1.9 billion in 2005 and provides 70% of the country’s total export earnings. Oil production in Sudan as of 2007 was at 466,100 barrels of oil a day.
In 2004, the cessation of major north-south hostilities and expanding crude oil exports resulted in 6.4% GDP growth and a near doubling of GDP per capita since 2003. The aftereffects of the 21-year civil war and very limited infrastructure, however, present obstacles to stronger growth and a broader distribution of income.
Extensive petroleum exploration began in the mid-1970s and might cover all of Sudan’s economic and energy needs. Significant finds were made in the Upper Nile region and commercial quantities of oil began to be exported in October 2000, reducing Sudan’s outflow of foreign exchange for imported petroleum products. There are indications of significant potential reserves of oil and natural gas in southern Sudan, the Kordofan region and the Red Sea province.
Historically, the U.S., the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have supplied most of Sudan’s economic assistance. Sudan’s role as an economic link between Arab and African countries is reflected by the presence in Khartoum of the Arab Bank for African Development. The World Bank had been the largest source of development loans.Sudan will require extraordinary levels of program assistance and debt relief to manage a foreign debt exceeding $21 billion, more than the country’s entire annual gross domestic product. During the late 1970s and 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and key donors worked closely to promote reforms to counter the effect of inefficient economic policies and practices.
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85: IMF Debt
Sudan became the world’s largest debtor to the World Bank and IMF by 1993, its relationship with the international financial institutions soured in the mid-1990s and has yet to be fully rehabilitated. The government fell out of compliance with an IMF standby program and accumulated substantial arrearages on repurchase obligations. A 4-year economic reform plan was announced in 1988 but was not pursued. An economic reform plan was announced in 1989 and implementation began on a 3-year economic restructuring program designed to reduce the public sector deficit, end subsidies, privatize state enterprises, and encourage new foreign and domestic investment. In 1993, the IMF suspended Sudan’s voting rights and the World Bank suspended Sudan’s right to make withdrawals under effective and fully disbursed loans and credits. Lome Funds and European Union agricultural credits, totaling more than 1 billion euros, also were suspended.
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86: US Relations
Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the U.S. in June 1967, following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. Relations improved after July 1971, when the Sudanese Communist Party attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri, and Nimeiri suspected Soviet involvement. U.S. assistance for resettlement of refugees following the 1972 peace settlement with the south added further improved relations.
On March 1, 1973, Palestinian terrorists of the "Black September" organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis G. Moore in Khartoum. Sudanese officials arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges. In June 1974, however, they were released to the custody of the Egyptian Government. The U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan was withdrawn in protest. Although the U.S. Ambassador returned to Khartoum in November, relations with the Sudan remained static until early 1976, when President Nimeiri mediated the release of 10 American hostages being held by Eritrean insurgents in rebel strongholds in northern Ethiopia. In 1976, the U.S. decided to resume economic assistance to Sudan.
In late 1985, there was a reduction in staff at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum because of the presence in Khartoum of a large contingent of Libyan terrorists. In April 1986, relations with Sudan deteriorated when the U.S. bombed Tripoli, Libya. A U.S. Embassy employee was shot on April 16, 1986. Immediately following this incident, all non-essential personnel and all dependents left for 6 months. At this time, Sudan was the single largest recipient of U.S. development and military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, official U.S. development assistance was suspended in 1989 in the wake of the military coup against the elected government, which brought to power the National Islamist Front led by General Bashir.
U.S. relations with Sudan were further strained in the 1990s. Sudan backed Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait and provided sanctuary and assistance to Islamic terrorist groups. In the early and mid-1990s, Carlos the Jackal, Osama bin Laden, Abu Nidal, and other terrorist leaders resided in Khartoum. Sudan’s role in the radical Pan-Arab Islamic Conference represented a matter of great concern to the security of American officials and dependents in Khartoum, resulting in several draw downs and/or evacuations of U.S. personnel from Khartoum in the early-mid 1990s. Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and a suspension of U.S. Embassy operations in Khartoum in 1996. In October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the Sudan. In August 1998, in the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes against Khartoum. The last U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Ambassador Tim Carney, departed post prior to this event and no new ambassador has been designated since. The U.S. Embassy is headed by a Charge d’Affaires. The Embassy continues to re-evaluate its posture in Sudan, particularly in the wake of the January 1, 2008, killings of a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) employee and his Sudanese driver in Khartoum.
The U.S. and Sudan entered into a bilateral dialogue on counterterrorism in May 2000. Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against international terrorism since the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes on New York and Washington. However, although Sudan publicly supported the international coalition actions against the al Qaida network and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the government criticized the U.S. strikes in that country and opposed a widening of the effort against international terrorism to other countries. Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list.
In response to the Government of Sudan’s continued complicity in unabated violence occurring in Darfur, President Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May 2007. The sanctions blocked assets of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned additional companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. Sanctions continue to underscore U.S. efforts to end the suffering of the millions of Sudanese affected by the crisis in Darfur.
Despite policy differences the U.S. has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to the Sudan throughout the last quarter-century. The U.S. was a major donor in the March 1989 "Operation Lifeline Sudan," which delivered 100,000 metric tons of food into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, thus averting widespread starvation. In 1991, the U.S. made major donations to alleviate food shortages caused by a 2-year drought. In a similar drought in 2000-2001, the U.S. and the international community responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan. In 2001 the Bush administration named a presidential envoy for peace in the Sudan to explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid. Andrew Natsios and subsequently Ambassador Richard Williamson served as presidential envoys to Sudan during the Bush administration. On March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan.
On October 19, 2009, Secretary Clinton, accompanied by Special Envoy Gration and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, announced the Obama administration’s new Sudan strategy. U.S. strategy in Sudan is comprised of three core principles: 1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; 2) Implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and 3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.
In March 2011, Princeton N. Lyman was appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan.
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--vacant
Charge d'Affaires--Robert E. Whitehead
Deputy Chief of Mission--Dennis Hankins
USAID Director--Bill Hammink
Political-Economic Chief--Helen C. Hudson
Public Affairs Officer--William Bellis
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88: JINSA
The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs Mandate
- Provide leadership and affect policy on crucial issues of national security and foreign policy;
- Promote American security cooperation with like-minded democratic countries including, but not limited to, Israel;
- Engage the American defense community about the role Israel can and does play in securing Western, democratic interests in the Middle East and Mediterranean regions; and
- Improve awareness in the general public, as well as in the Jewish community of the importance of a strong American defense capability.
The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) is a 501 non-profit, non-partisan and non-sectarian educational organization committed to explaining the need for a prudent national security policy for the United States, addressing the security requirements of both the United States and the State of Israel, and strengthening the strategic cooperation relationship between these two great democracies. Founded as a result of the lessons learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, JINSA communicates with the national security establishment and the general public to explain the role Israel can and does play in bolstering American interests, as well as the link between American defense policy and the security of Israel. Over the years, JINSA has achieved a reputation as a credible and independent resource. Its findings and recommendations are published in a variety of formats including a web site, JINSA Online (www.jinsa.org); regular op-eds called JINSA Reports distributed by e-mail; The Journal of International Security Affairs; periodic think-pieces called Viewpoints; and occasional books, monographs and conference proceedings.
JINSA's annual programs include sponsoring a trip for retired United States Flag and General Officers to Israel and a study program in Israel for cadets and midshipmen from the Naval Academy, the Military Academy at West Point, and the Air Force Academy. JINSA also arranges interchanges between Pentagon officials and Jewish community leadership and sponsors lectures and conferences at the national military academies and leading national security think tanks. These programs are aimed at facilitating dialogue between security policy makers, military officials, diplomats, and the community at large to increase the understanding of national security issues. JINSA is a national organization based in Washington D.C. It receives support from thousands of members nationwide and is governed by a Board of Directors comprised of key figures in the national security community and leadership throughout the country.
Basic Facts About JINSA
With more than 30 years experience, JINSA has tremendous expertise in security matters. JINSA provides information, analyses and assistance to the defense establishment, the administration, Congress, the media, and JINSA members. JINSA designs its programs to promote American Israel security cooperation to benefit both countries. JINSA is Forward Looking - JINSA deals today with those issues that will impact upon American and Israeli national security tomorrow.
On September 13th, 2001 JINSA circulated this document expressing the need to take care of not only Afghanistan but also
" Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, the Palestinian Authority, Libya, Algeria and even our presumed friends Saudi Arabia and Egypt."
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89: Israel Defense Force (IDF)
Israel's ground, air, and naval forces, known as the Israel Defense Force (IDF), fall under the command of a single general staff. Conscription is universal for Jewish men and women over the age of 18, although exemptions may be made on religious grounds.
The defense budget in 2009 totaled U.S. $12 billion, representing 6.2% of GDP, and accounting for 16.3% of government expenditures. U.S. military aid to Israel in 2009 totaled U.S. $2.55 billion. This will increase to U.S. $3 billion in 2012, and will total U.S. $3.15 billion per year from 2013 to 2018.
In 1983, the United States and Israel established the Joint Political Military Group, which meets twice a year. Both the U.S. and Israel participate in joint military planning and combined exercises, and have collaborated on military research and weapons development.
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90: US Relations
Commitment to Israel's security and well being has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel's founding in 1948, in which the United States played a key supporting role.
Israel and the United States are bound closely by historic and cultural ties as well as by mutual interests. Continuing U.S. economic and security assistance to Israel acknowledges these ties and signals U.S. commitment. The broad issues of Arab-Israeli peace have been a major focus in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.
U.S. efforts to reach a Middle East peace settlement are based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and have been based on the premise that as Israel takes calculated risks for peace the United States will help minimize those risks.
On a bilateral level, relations between the United States and Israel are continually strengthening in every field. In addition to the Joint Political-Military Group, there are: bilateral science and technology efforts (including the Binational Science Foundation and the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Foundation); the U.S.-Israeli Education Foundation, which sponsors educational and cultural programs; the Joint Economic Development Group, which maintains a high-level dialogue on economic issues; the Joint Counterterrorism Group, designed to enhance cooperation in fighting terrorism; and a high-level Strategic Dialogue.
Principal U.S. Officials
U.S. Embassy
Ambassador--James Cunningham
Deputy Chief of Mission--Thomas Goldberger
Political Affairs--Robert Silverman
Economic Affairs--David Burnett
Management-- Robert Davis
Consular Affairs--Andrew Parker
Public Affairs--Hillary Olsin-Windecker
Commercial Affairs--Jonathan Heimer
Science Attache--Paul Rohrlich
Defense Attache-- Col. Richard Burgess
Legal Attache-- Jeff Walker
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91: Drone Production
Israel is the 2nd largest manufacturer of UAF's or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
The Israeli drone program however is pretty mysterious and not much information is available.
Here is an article from Popular Mechanics from February 23rd, 2010.
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92: Drone Production
On August 22nd, 2010, Iran presented it's first locally manufactured drone bomber the 'Karran'.
Ahmadinejad said "If there is an ignorant person or an egoist or a tyrant who just wanted to make an aggression then our Defense Ministry should reach a point where it could cut off the hand of the aggressor before it decided to make an aggression,... We should reach a point when Iran would serve as a defense umbrella for all freedom-loving nations in the face of world aggressors. We don't want to attack anywhere, Iran will never decide to attack anywhere, but our revolution cannot sit idle in the face of tyranny, we can't remain indifferent."
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93: Petroleum and Natural Gas
Exports--$78.69 billion (2010 est.): petroleum 80%
Major export partners (2009)--China (16.58 %), Japan (11.9 %), India (10.54 %), South Korea (7.54 %), Turkey (4.63 %).
1970s Iran had achieved significant industrialization and economic modernization, largely helped by the growing worldwide demand for oil.recovery has proven elusive due to a combination of factors, including state interference in the economy and fluctuations in the global energy market.These conditions were worsened by the war with Iraq and the decline in world oil prices beginning in late 1985. After the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s economic situation began to improve: GDP grew for two consecutive years, partly from an oil windfall in 1990,
Although Islam guarantees the right to private ownership, banks and some industries--including the petroleum, transportation, utilities, and mining sectors--were nationalized after the revolution. Under President Rafsanjani
High oil prices in recent years have allowed Iran to greatly increase its export earnings and amass over $70 billion in foreign exchange reserves.,
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94: Mining and Minerals
coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead manganese, zinc, sulfur.
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95: US Relations
On April 7, 1980, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, and on April 24, 1981, the Swiss Government assumed representation of U.S. interests in Tehran. Iranian affairs in the United States are represented by the Embassy of Pakistan, in the Iranian Interests Section, in Washington, DC. The Islamic Republic of Iran also has a permanent mission to the United Nations in New York City.
In accordance with the Algiers declaration of January 20, 1981, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (located in The Hague, Netherlands) was established for the purpose of handling claims of U.S. nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the U.S. However, U.S. interaction with Iran at The Hague solely covers legal matters.
The U.S. Government, by executive orders issued by the President as well as by congressional legislation, prohibits nearly all trade with Iran. Sanctions have been imposed on Iran because of its sponsorship of terrorism, its refusal to comply with IAEA regulations regarding its nuclear program, and its human rights violations. However, these sanctions are meant to target the Iranian Government, not the people of Iran. As a result, there are a number of exemptions allowed by the U.S. Government intended to benefit the Iranian people. The following trade is permitted: licensed exports of U.S. agricultural and medical products to Iran, U.S. donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering in Iran (food, clothing, etc.), gifts valued at $100 or less, and trade in “informational” materials (films, publications, etc.),. Trade restrictions have been temporarily lifted in the past during humanitarian crises, such as the 2003 Bam earthquake, to allow for donations from American citizens and permit U.S.-based non-governmental organizations to assist with the relief and reconstruction efforts. As the sanctions towards Iran have changed throughout time, please visit the website of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for a comprehensive overview of legally permitted trade with Iran. (http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf).
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98: Petroleum
Exports (2008 est.)--$13.6 billion: crude oil, minerals, petroleum products
Major markets (2007)--Italy 22%, France 11%, Saudi Arabia 10%, Iraq 5%, Egypt 4%, Jordan 4%
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99: Mining and Mineral Deposits
phosphates, iron, chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, rock salt, marble, gypsum
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102: US Relations
Syria's 1990 participation in the U.S.-led multinational coalition aligned against Saddam Hussein marked a dramatic watershed in Syria's relations both with other Arab states and with the West. Syria participated in the multilateral Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. During the 1990s, Syria engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with Israel; these negotiations failed.
Syria opposed the Iraq war in March 2003, and bilateral relations with the United States swiftly deteriorated. In December 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, which provided for the imposition of a series of sanctions against Syria if Syria did not end its support for Palestinian terrorist groups, curtail its military and security interference in Lebanon, cease its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and meet its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. In May 2004, the President determined that Syria had not met these conditions and implemented sanctions that prohibit the export to Syria of U.S. products except for food and medicine, and the taking off from or landing in the United States of Syrian Government-owned aircraft. At the same time, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced its intention to order U.S. financial institutions to sever correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria based on money-laundering concerns, pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Acting under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the President also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to freeze assets belonging to certain Syrian individuals and entities.
Syria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list's inception in 1979. Because of its continuing support and safe haven for terrorist organizations, Syria is subject to legislatively mandated penalties, including export sanctions and ineligibility to receive most forms of U.S. aid or to purchase U.S. military equipment. In 1986, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador and imposed additional administrative sanctions on Syria in response to evidence of direct Syrian involvement in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airplane. A U.S. ambassador returned to Damascus in 1987, partially in response to positive Syrian actions against terrorism such as expelling the Abu Nidal Organization from Syria and helping free an American hostage earlier that year.
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Robert Stephen Ford
Deputy Chief of Mission--Charles Hunter
Head of the Political Section--Amy Tachco
Head of the Economic Section--Joanne Cummings
Consul General--Andre Goodfriend
Management Counselor--Natalie Cropper
Public Affairs Officer--Angela Williams
Defense Attache--Robert Friedenberg
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103: Mining and Mineral Deposits
Hydrocarbons, gold, uranium, bauxite, coal, iron, phosphate, tungsten, zinc, silver, copper.
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104: US Relations
During and after the Gulf War, the Government of Saudi Arabia provided water, food, shelter, and fuel for coalition forces in the region, and also made monetary payments to some coalition partners. Saudi Arabia's combined costs in payments, foregone revenues, and donated supplies were $55 billion. More than $15 billion went toward reimbursing the United States alone.
Saudi Arabia's unique role in the Arab and Islamic worlds, its possession of the world's largest reserves of oil, and its strategic location make its friendship important to the United States. Diplomatic relations were established in 1933; the U.S. embassy opened in Jeddah in 1944 and moved to Riyadh in 1984. The Jeddah embassy became a U.S. consulate general. The U.S. consulate general in Dhahran opened in 1944 in response to the growing oil-related U.S. presence in eastern Saudi Arabia.
The United States and Saudi Arabia share common concerns about regional security, oil exports and imports, and sustainable development. Close consultations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have developed on international, economic, and development issues such as the Middle East peace process and shared interests in the Gulf. The continued availability of reliable sources of oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia, remains important to the prosperity of the United States as well as to Europe and Japan. Saudi Arabia is one of the leading sources of imported oil for the United States, providing more than one million barrels/day of oil to the U.S. market. The U.S. is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, and Saudi Arabia is the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East.In addition to economic ties, a longstanding security relationship continues to be important in U.S.-Saudi relations. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has a role in military and civilian construction activities in the kingdom reaching back to the 1950s. A U.S. military training mission established at Dhahran in 1953 provides training and support in the use of weapons and other security-related services to the Saudi armed forces. In 1973, another security assistance organization (SAO) was established to assist in the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. More recently a SAO was authorized to train and equip a Facility Security Force, part of the Ministry of Interior. All three of these SAOs are funded through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The United States has sold Saudi Arabia military aircraft (F-15s, AWACS, and UH-60 Blackhawks), air defense weaponry (Patriot and Hawk missiles), armored vehicles (M1A2 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles), and other equipment. In September 2010 the U.S. announced a major new FMS program to sell fighter aircraft and helicopters to the Saudi military services in support of defense modernization plans. Saudi Arabia is now one of the United States' strongest partners against terrorism. Fifteen of the suicide bombers in the attacks of September 11 were Saudi citizens. In May 2003, a terrorist organization directly affiliated with al-Qaeda launched a violent campaign of terror in Saudi Arabia. On May 12, suicide bombers killed 35 people, including nine Americans, in attacks at three housing compounds for Westerners in Riyadh. On November 8, 2003, terrorists attacked another compound housing foreign workers from mainly Arab countries. At least 18 people, including five children, died in this attack, and more than 100 were injured. On May 1, 2004, terrorists killed two Americans in the Yanbu oil facility in the western part of the country. On May 29, 2004, terrorists killed one American and wounded several others in attacks on an official building and housing compound in al-Khobar in the Eastern Province. On June 6, terrorists shot and killed a BBC journalist. On June 9 and June 12, 2004, terrorists killed Americans Robert Jacobs and Kenneth Scroggs. On June 18, 2004, terrorists kidnapped and beheaded American Paul Johnson. On December 6, 2004, terrorists attacked the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, killing five consulate employees. Terrorists also targeted and killed other foreign nationalities during this time. As a result, in 2005, the Saudi Arabian Government enacted new laws to increase punishment for terrorist-related crimes.Saudi security services have waged an active counterterrorism campaign that has largely neutralized this terrorist organization, though sporadic instances of terrorism still occur. In May 2006, terrorists attempted to attack the major ARAMCO oil-processing facility at Abqaiq. In February 2007, four French nationals were killed in western Saudi Arabia in a suspected terrorist attack. In August 2009, an al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suicide bomber attempted to assassinate a Saudi royal and senior Ministry of Interior official.
Saudi Arabia is a strong partner in the campaign against terrorism, providing military, diplomatic, and financial cooperation. Counterterrorism cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States increased significantly after the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh and continues today. In February 2005, the Saudi Government sponsored the first-ever Counterterrorism International Conference in Riyadh. The Saudis were instrumental in thwarting the planned October 2010 “printer bomb” attack against the United States. They also provided crucial information on the planned May 2010 Times Square terrorist attack. In addition, they work closely with U.S. law enforcement to ensure the security of both countries' national security interests.
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--James B. Smith
Deputy Chief of Mission--Susan L. Ziadeh
Counselor for Consular Affairs--Glen Keiser
Counselor for Economic Affairs--Angus Simmons
Counselor for Management Affairs--Alison Barkley
Counselor for Political Affairs--Lisa Carle
Counselor for Political-Military Affairs--Scott McGehee
Counselor for Public Affairs--Bonnie Gutman
Consul General, Dhahran--Timothy Pounds
Consul General, Jeddah--Tom Duffy
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105: Petroleum and Natural Gas
Exports (2010)--$7.5 billion: crude petroleum, liquefied natural gas, refined oil products
Major markets--China, India, Thailand, South Africa, South Korea, United States, Switzerland.
While Yemen is a relatively minor oil producer when compared to its Gulf neighbors, energy exports generate the majority of governmental revenue. Production peaked in 2001 at approximately 440,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) and has declined since. In 2010, the country produced, on average,approximately 260,000 bbl/d. Following a minor discovery in southern Yemen in 1982, an American company found an oil basin near Marib in 1984, and a small oil refinery began operations two years later. A Soviet discovery in the southern governorate of Shabwa proved only marginally successful.. A Western consortium began exporting oil from Masila in Hadramaut governorate in 1993, and production there reached 420,000 bbl/d in 1999. There are new finds in the Jannah (formerly known as the Joint Oil Exploration Area) and east Shabwah blocks.n November 2005, Hunt Oil’s 20-year contract for the management of Block 18 fields ended. Despite agreement with the Government of Yemen on a 5-year extension, the Republic of Yemen Government abrogated the agreement via a parliamentary vote that was not called for in the contract. The U.S.-based Hunt Oil company sued Yemen in a Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce commercial arbitration court in 2005. The court’s decision has been kept confidential, according to both sides’ wishes. Hunt Oil continues to operate in Yemen, although in a much smaller oil exploration block.By 2010, oil exports had grown to approximately $5.5 billion and comprised roughly 70 percent of governmental revenue. Crude oil production has declined steadily in past years due to dwindling reserves, lack of maintenance on some equipment, and a lack of new investment in exploration activities.Oil located near Marib contains associated natural gas. Yemen’s natural gas reserves are currently being exported in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and projects are underway that utilize Yemen’s LNG to fuel several natural gas-fired power plants. The Yemen LNG project at the port of Balhaf on the Gulf of Aden became commercially operational in October 2009 and will generate much needed revenue to partially offset declining oil revenues.
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106: US Relations
On December 7, 1967, the United States recognized the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and elevated its Consulate General in Aden to embassy status. However, relations were strained. The PDRY was placed on the list of nations that support terrorism. On October 24, 1969, south Yemen formally broke diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States and the PDRY reestablished diplomatic relations on April 30, 1990, only 3 weeks before the announcement of unification. However, the embassy in Aden, which closed in 1969, was never reopened, and the PDRY as a political entity no longer exists.
During a 1979 border conflict between the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the United States cooperated with Saudi Arabia to greatly expand the security assistance program to the YAR by providing F-5 aircraft, tanks, vehicles, and training. George H.W. Bush, while Vice President, visited in April 1986, and President Ali Abdullah Saleh visited the United States in January 1990. The United States had a $42 million USAID program in 1990. From 1973 to 1990, the United States provided the YAR with assistance in the agriculture, education, and health and water sectors. Many Yemenis were sent on U.S. government scholarships to study in the region and in the United States. There was a Peace Corps program with about 50 volunteers. The U.S. Information Service operated an English-language institute in Sanaa.
In 1990, as a result of Yemen's actions in the Security Council following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States drastically reduced its presence in Yemen, including canceling all military cooperation, non-humanitarian assistance, and the Peace Corps program. USAID levels dropped in FY 1991 to $2.9 million, but food assistance through the PL 480 and PL 416 (B) programs continued through 2006. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture provided 30,000 metric tons of soybean meal that were sold for approximately $7.5 million to finance programs in support of Yemen’s agricultural sector.
The United States was actively involved in and strongly supportive of parliamentary elections in 1993 as well as the 2006 presidential and local council elections, and continues working to strengthen Yemen's democratic institutions. The USAID program, focused in the health field, slowly increased to $8.5 million in FY 1995, but experienced a brief hiatus after 2000. In 2003, USAID reopened its mission in Yemen with assistance principally focused on basic education, maternal and child health, and agriculture. The program has increased substantially since then; FY 2010 funding for USAID programs in Yemen was approximately $48 million with programs focused primarily on livelihoods and governance. In addition, since 2004 the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has provided more than $2.7 million in grants directly to Yemeni organizations supporting civil society. Approximately 30 local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have implemented programs in priority areas such as anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance and early childhood marriage.
Defense relations between Yemen and the United States are improving rapidly, with the resumption of International Military Education and Training assistance and the transfer of military equipment and spare parts. In FY 2010 approximate funding for U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Yemen was $12.5 million, International Military Education and Training (IMET) was $1 million, and Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) was $5 million. In FY 2010 Yemen also received approximately $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $35 million in development assistance, and $155 million in Section 1206 funding.
In November 2006, a World Bank-sponsored international donor conference in London resulted in pledges of $4.7 billion for Yemen's development. The funds were to be disbursed between 2007 and 2010; however, delivery was much slower than expected and remains incomplete. In January 2010, the U.K. hosted a ministerial meeting in London, gathering Western and Arab countries with interests in Yemen, known as the “Friends of Yemen.” Through the formation of two working groups on “Economy and Governance” and “Justice and Rule of Law,” the “Friends” process has helped identify short-term priorities and develop a coordinated response to Yemen’s many challenges. The “Friends” met at another ministerial-level meeting in New York in September 2010 and the process of implementing their recommendations remains ongoing..
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Gerald M. Feierstein
Deputy Chief of Mission--Elizabeth Richard
Chief, Public Affairs Office--Deborah Smith
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107: ECOWAS
4,000 French Soldiers and 3,000 Soldiers from various African countries stationed in 2003.
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108: US Relations
The United States and South Korea are taking additional steps to advance their military cooperation into a strategic alliance of bilateral, global scope, both nations’ defense leaders said at a news conference in the South Korean capital of Seoul, Oct. 28, 2011.
Panetta said denuclearization is an important area for North Korea to address if it wants to improve relations with the alliance.
“It’s no secret that denuclearization means that they have to stop testing, they have to stop developing weapons, they have to stop enriching [uranium] in violation of international rules and requirements,” the secretary said. “They have to allow [inspections]. It’s all of those areas that would have to be addressed, and … are in the process of being discussed with the North Koreans.”
Under the 1953 U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States agreed to help the Republic of Korea defend itself against external aggression. In support of this commitment, the United States has maintained military personnel in Korea, including the Army's Second Infantry Division and several Air Force tactical squadrons. To coordinate operations between these units and the over 680,000-strong Korean armed forces, a Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established in 1978. The head of the CFC also serves as Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). The current CFC commander is General Walter “Skip” Sharp.
Several aspects of the U.S.-R.O.K. security relationship are changing as the U.S. moves from a leading to a supporting role. In 2004 an agreement was reached on the return of the Yongsan base in Seoul--as well as a number of other U.S. bases--to the R.O.K. and the eventual relocation of all U.S. forces to south of the Han River. Those movements are expected to be completed by 2016. In addition, the U.S. and R.O.K. agreed to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Korea to 25,000 by 2008, but a subsequent agreement by the U.S. and R.O.K. presidents in 2008 has now capped that number at 28,500, with no further troop reductions planned. The U.S. and R.O.K. have also agreed to transfer wartime operational control to the R.O.K. military on December 1, 2015.
As Korea's economy has developed, trade and investment ties have become an increasingly important aspect of the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship. Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner (ranking ahead of larger economies such as France, Italy, and India), and there are significant flows of manufactured goods, agricultural products, services and technology between the two countries. Major American firms have long been major investors in Korea, while Korea's leading firms have begun to make significant investments in the United States. The implementation of structural reforms contained in the IMF's 1998 program for Korea improved access to the Korean market and improved trade relations between the United States and Korea. Building on that improvement, the United States and Korea launched negotiations on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) on February 2, 2006. On June 30, 2007, the United States and Korea signed a comprehensive FTA that would eliminate virtually all barriers to trade and investment between the two countries. Tariffs on 95% of trade between the two countries were to be eliminated within 3 years of implementation, with virtually all the remaining tariffs to be removed within 10 years of implementation; the FTA's chapters addressed non-tariff measures in investment, intellectual property, services, competition policy, and other areas. In December 2010, President Barack Obama announced the successful resolution of outstanding issues in the agreement, which would eliminate tariffs on over 95% of industrial and consumer goods within 5 years; the agreement is currently awaiting ratification. The KORUS FTA is the largest free trade agreement Korea has ever signed, the largest free trade agreement for the United States since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, and the United States’ first FTA with a major Asian economy. Economists have projected that the FTA will generate billions of dollars in increased trade and investment between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and boost economic growth and job creation in both countries.
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--D. Kathleen Stephens
Deputy Chief of Mission--Mark Tokola
Counselor for Political Affairs--James Wayman
Counselor for Economic Affairs--Gregory Burton
Counselor for Management Affairs--Mary Martinez
Counselor for Public Affairs--Patrick Linehan
Consul General--Cynthia Sharpe
Counselor for Commercial Affairs--James Sullivan
Counselor for Agricultural Affairs--Kathryn Ting
Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K)--Col. Ha Dong Chin
Defense Attache--Col. Kevin Madden
Drug Enforcement Administration, Special Agent in Charge--Edward Fiocchi
Open Source Center, Seoul Bureau Chief--Kristen Patel
DHS-Citizenship and Immigration Services--Kenneth Sherman
DHS-Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attache--Jeffrey Deal
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109: International Trade
South Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner and is the 15th-largest economy in the world.
The Republic of Korea maintains diplomatic relations with more than 170 countries and a broad network of trading relationships. The United States and Korea are allied by the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Korea and Japan coordinate closely on numerous issues. This includes consultations with the United States on North Korea policy.
Until recently, South Korea was North Korea's second-largest trading partner after China.Much of the work done in North Korea has been funded by South Korea, but this assistance was halted in 2008 except for energy aid (heavy fuel oil) authorized under the Six-Party Talks.
North-South economic ties were seriously damaged by escalating tensions following North Korea’s torpedoing of the South Korean warship Cheonan in March 2010. In September 2010, South Korea suspended all inter-Korean trade with the exception of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
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110: US Troops
The 2nd Infantry Division is currently stationed in South Korea. It is comprised of approximately 30,000 soldiers
Its current primary mission is the defense of South Korea in the initial stages of an invasion from North Korea until other American units can arrive
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111: Kunsan Air Base
United States Airforce base home of the 8th Fighter Wing, "The Wolfpack".
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112: Osan Air Base
A United States Air Force facility, the base is the home of the Pacific Air Forces' 51st Fighter Wing, and a number of tenant units, including the headquarters for Seventh Air Force. The base is also the headquarters of the ROK Air Force Operations Command. Osan Air Base is also the departure and arrival point for US-government contracted "Patriot Express" flights bringing servicemembers and their family members to Korea.
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113: Incirlik Air Base
The U.S. Air Force and the Turkish Air Force are the primary users of the base
Incirlik is the home of the 10th Air Wing of the 2nd Air Force Command of the Turkish Air Force. Incirlik has a United States Air Force complement of about 5,000 airmen, with several hundred British and Turkish Air Force airmen also present. The primary unit stationed here is the 39th Air Base Wing (39 ABW)
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114: Transit Center at Manas
Formerly Manas Air Base and unofficially Ganci Air Base) is a United States military installation at Manas International Airport
The base was opened in December 2001 to support U.S. military operations in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Regional powers such as Russia and China have been pushing for the closure of the base since 2005.
In February 2009 the Kyrgyz Parliament voted to close the base after the two governments failed to agree on a higher rent for the property. American and Kyrgyz officials continued negotiations after the announcement, and on the 23rd June a tentative agreement was reached. Under the new arrangement the United States will pay $200 million for continued use of the facilities, three times the previous rent. Additionally, Kyrgyz forces now handle security in the areas surrounding the facility while American forces continue to provide security for the facility, and the site is now called a "transit center" instead of an "air base"
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115: Bagram Air Base
Bagram Air Base, is a militarized airport and housing complex. The base is run by a US Army division headed by a major general. A large part of the base, however, is "owned" by the United States Air Force (455th Air Expeditionary Wing). The area under Air Force control (about half of the overall base) includes the flight line, the ramp, and most of the area involving air mission resources. The base is currently occupied and maintained by the Combined Joint Task Force 1st Cavalry Division (CJTF-1), having taken over from the 101st Airborne Division in the first half of 2011. The airfield is occupied and maintained by 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (Task Force Falcon) and 3-10 GSAB (Task Force Phoenix) of the United States Army, with the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing of the United States Air Force and other U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, and their NATO/ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) coalition partner units having sizeable tenant populations.
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116: Shindand Air Base
Once the largest Afghan Air Force base, it is now used by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for humanitarian, training, and medical flights. The United States Air Force's 838th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group is based at Shindand AB supporting the ISAF mission.
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117: Kandahar International Airport
As of 2007, Kandahar Airport has been rebuilt and is used for both military and civilian flights. At first it was mainly occupied by the United States armed forces but since 2006 the airfield has been maintained by NATO. There are also other forces present from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
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118: Strait of Malacca
At its narrowest point in the Phillips Channel of the Singapore Strait, Malacca is only 1.7 miles wide creating a natural bottleneck, as well as potential for collisions, grounding, or oil spills. According to the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre, piracy, including attempted theft and hijackings, is a constant threat to tankers in the Strait of Malacca, although the number of attacks has dropped due to the increased patrols by the littoral states authorities since July 2005.
Over 60,000 vessels transit the Strait of Malacca per year. If the strait were blocked, nearly half of the world’s fleet would be required to reroute around the Indonesian archipelago through Lombok Strait, located between the islands of Bali and Lombok, or the Sunda Strait, located between Java and Sumatra.
There have been several proposals to build bypasses to reduce tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca. Construction began in 2009 to build a 240,000 bbl/d crude oil pipeline from Burma to China that could eventually be expanded.
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119: The Bosporus and Dardanelles: Turkish Straits
An estimated 2.9 million bbl/d flowed through this passageway in 2009, of which over 2.5 million bbl/d was crude oil. The ports of the Black Sea are one of the primary oil export routes for Russia and other former Soviet Union republics. Oil shipments through the Turkish Straits decreased from over 3.4 million bbl/d at its peak in 2004 to 2.6 million bbl/d in 2006 as Russia shifted crude oil exports toward the Baltic ports. Traffic through the Straits has increased again as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan crude production and exports rose.
Only half a mile wide at its narrowest point, the Turkish Straits are one of the world’s most difficult waterways to navigate due to its sinuous geography. With 50,000 vessels, including 5,500 oil tankers, passing through the straits annually it is also one of the world’s busiest chokepoints.
Turkey has raised concerns over the navigational safety and environmental threats to the Straits. Commercial shipping has the right of free passage through the Bosporus Straits in peacetime, although Turkey claims the right to impose regulations for safety and environmental purposes. Bottlenecks and heavy traffic also create problems for oil tankers in the Bosporus Straits. While there are no current alternate routes for westward shipments from the Black and Caspian Sea region, there are several pipeline projects in various phases of development underway.
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120: Danish Straits
An estimated 3.3 million bbl/d flowed westward through this waterway in 2009 to European markets, up from 2.4 million bbl/d in 2005. Russia has increasingly been shifting its crude oil exports to its Baltic ports, especially the relatively new port of Primorsk, which accounted for half of the exports through the Straits.
An additional 0.3 million bbl/d of crude oil, primarily from Norway, flows eastward to Scandinavian markets.
About one-third of the westward exports through the Straits are for refined products, coming from Baltic Sea ports such as Tallinn (Muuga), Venstpils, and St. Petersburg.
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124: Mining and Mineral Deposits
Coal, chromium, mercury, copper, boron, oil, gold.
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125: International Trade
Exports (merchandise)--(2005) $73.5 billion; (2006) $85.5 billion; (2007) $107.2 billion; (2008) $132 billion; (2009) $102.1 billion; (2010) $113.9 billion. Export types (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2011)--textiles and apparel, industrial machinery, iron and steel, electronics, petroleum products, and motor vehicles. Imports (merchandise)--(2005) $116.8 billion; (2006) $139.6 billion; (2007) $170.1 billion; (2008) $201.8 billion; (2009) $140.4 billion; (2010) $185.9 billion. Import types--chemicals, petroleum, machinery, motor vehicles, electronics, iron, steel, plastics, precious metals. Major partners--Germany, U.S., Italy, France, Russia, Japan, China, Iran, Iraq, U.K.
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126: US Relations
U.S.-Turkish friendship dates to the late 18th century and was officially sealed by a treaty in 1830. The present close relationship began with the agreement of July 12, 1947, which implemented the Truman Doctrine. As part of the cooperative effort to further Turkish economic and military self-reliance, the United States has loaned and granted Turkey more than $7 billion in economic aid and more than $14 billion in military assistance over several years.
U.S.-Turkish relations focus on areas such as strategic energy cooperation, trade and investment, security ties, regional stability, counterterrorism, and human rights progress. Relations were strained when Turkey refused in March 2003 to allow U.S. troops to deploy through its territory to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but regained momentum steadily thereafter, and mutual interests remain strong across a wide spectrum of issues. Turkey currently allows the use of Incirlik Air Base for the transport of non-lethal cargo in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. On July 5, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul signed a Shared Vision Statement to highlight the common values and goals between the two countries and to lay out a framework for increased strategic dialogue. During a November 5, 2007 meeting in Washington with Prime Minister Erdogan, President George W. Bush committed to provide greater assistance to Turkey in its fight against terrorism from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK or Kongra Gel), which he characterized as a "common enemy" of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. He reiterated this commitment during President Gul's January 8, 2008, White House visit.
President Barack Obama paid a historic visit to Turkey April 5-7, 2009, the first bilateral visit of his presidency. During the visit, he spoke before the Turkish Parliament and outlined his vision of a model U.S.-Turkish partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also prioritized the U.S.-Turkey relationship, and visited Turkey in March 2009 and July 2011. On December 7, 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Obama launched the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation (FSECC), a new cabinet-level initiative focused on boosting trade and investment ties. The inaugural FSECC meeting was held in Washington in October 2010. In addition to the new framework, the U.S. and Turkey hold meetings of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council and Economic Partnership Commission (EPC). As of June 2011, bilateral trade had increased by 50% since 2010 from $6.9 billion to $10.4 billion, with U.S. exports to Turkey up 58% from $4.9 billion to $7.8 billion and Turkish exports to the United States up 32% from $2.0 billion to $2.6 billion. This puts Turkey very close to its all-time record of exports to the U.S., and its export growth to the U.S. is outpacing export growth to the rest of the world (32% vice 23%).
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Mission--Jess L. Baily
Counselors
Political Affairs--Yuri Kim
Political-Military Affairs--Edward G. Stafford
Economic Affairs--Laird Treiber
Regional Affairs--Thomas Sylvester
Consular Affairs--Laurence Tobey
Management Affairs--Richard Jaworski
Public Affairs--Mark Wentworth
Agricultural Affairs--Clay Hamilton
Commercial Affairs--Michael Lally
Senior Defense Official--Brig. Gen. James “Ed” Daniel
The U.S. Embassy is located at 110 Ataturk Boulevard, Kavaklidere, Ankara 06100, tel: (90) (312) 455-5555.
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128: Panama Canal
Closure of the Panama Canal would greatly increase transit times and costs adding over 8,000 miles of travel. Vessels would have to reroute around the Straits of Magellan, Cape Horn and Drake Passage over the tip of South America.
However, the Panama Canal is not a significant route for petroleum transit or for U. S. petroleum imports. Roughly one-fifth of the traffic through the canal (measured by both transits and tonnage) was by tankers. According to the Panama Canal Authority, 0.8 million bbl/d of crude and petroleum products were transported through the canal in 2009, of which 620,000 bbl/d was refined products, and the rest crude oil. Most petroleum traffic passed from north (Atlantic) to South (Pacific).
However, the relevance of the Panama Canal to the global oil trade has diminished, as many modern tankers are too large to travel through the canal. Some oil tankers, such as the ULCC (Ultra Large Crude Carriers) class tankers, can be nearly five times larger than the maximum capacity of the canal. The largest vessel that can transit the Panama Canal is known as a PANAMAX-size vessel (ships ranging from 50,000 * 80,000 dead weight tons in size and no wider than 108 ft.)
In order to make the canal more accessible, the Panama Canal Authority began an expansion program to be completed by end-2014. However, while many larger tankers will be able to transit the canal after 2014, some ULCC*s will still be unable to make the transit.
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